To improve our current debate, understand how and when corporate governance issues are important to policies. In our income statement, entitled Universal Corporate Governance, we try to empirically answer the following two questions. Are some sets of corporate governance practices universally effective around the world? If some governance practices are not unconditionally applicable, under what conditions are they effective? To this end, we have collected information from major international corporate governance databases, including RiskMetrics (ISS), Thomson Reuters, MSCI and Factset, among others, and tested their relationship to company value on a large sample of more than 20,000 companies in 47 countries. Empirically, to investigate the (non) existence of a universal corporate governance model, we consider some sets of “good governance” from the perspective of corporate rules, ownership structure and legal investor protection.
In particular, we focus primarily on corporate rules that are more implementable and self-constructed, a “Global e-Index” as our main indicator of rules-based (lack of) governance. We then compare it to governance indices from existing studies (mostly based on U.S. samples for enterprise-level governance) and aggregated indices provided by major governance data providers (e.g. We found that the relationship between rules-based governance practices and company value varies substantially from country to country.
In many subsamples that are well studied in the literature (e.g. This result casts serious doubt on the existence of a universal corporate governance model, and hence the universality of a standard set of corporate governance practices around the world. In addition, we note that the effect of rules-based governance (ie,. In particular, its effect is strongest in companies with greater independent institutional ownership, greater investor protection and the rule of law, and under majority and left-wing political regimes.
On the contrary, we find that institutional (independent) ownership is conditionally associated with a higher q in all subsamples, which is consistent with recent advocates of the unique role of institutional investor activism in addressing agencies' problems in their portfolio companies. This is supported by our analysis of the voting results of shareholder proposals related to governance during shareholder meetings under a framework of regression and discontinuity for global companies. We found that, even within a small margin, the approval of corporate governance proposals, which are generally sponsored by institutional shareholders, is associated with positive reactions in the stock market. Corporate governance in the business context refers to the systems of rules, practices and processes by which companies are governed.
In this way, the corporate governance model followed by a specific company is the distribution of rights and responsibilities by all participants in the organization. Business Roundtable has been recognized for decades as an authoritative voice on issues affecting U.S. commercial corporations and meaningful and effective corporate governance practices. This theory is the most widely used in corporate governance research and shows a continuous increase (Huang and Ho, 201. The main participants in a corporation are stakeholders, management, and board of directors).
While the recommendations were aimed primarily at publicly traded companies, the Committee's objective was to raise general standards of corporate governance and the general level of public trust in financial reporting. It is worth noting that internationalization has not led to the convergence of corporate governance, but rather to a hybridization of corporate governance models, where practices developed in one national environment are transferred to another, where they adapt through their new specific institutional environment. As an investor, you want to make sure that the company looking to buy stock shares practices good corporate governance, hoping to avoid losses in cases such as Enron and Worldcom. Until the late 1980s, there used to be a clear distinction, and a division of labor, between corporate law and corporate finance.
The interests of all participants and stakeholders of the company who are affected by the decisions and actions that occur in it, as well as their participation in corporate governance are considered. Poor corporate governance leads to the bankruptcy of a company, often resulting in scandals and bankruptcies. In particular, special attention is paid to the board of directors, its ability to derive long-term value for the corporation and to balance interests between different parties. Allayannis, Lel and Miller (201) make a similar distinction in a study on the reasons for having foreign exchange derivatives, referring to corporate governance at the country level and corporate governance at the company level.
The board of directors has primary responsibility for the internal and external financial reporting functions of the corporation. The rights and responsibilities of the different participants within the corporation, including the board, managers and stakeholders, are clearly identified. This approach implies that corporate governance is oriented to the relationship between shareholders and managers who control and manage value creation, and only the interests of shareholders are taken into account. Corporate governance is an important global topic that has received a lot of attention in finance, economics, administration and international business.
Therefore, the proper objective of corporate governance is more likely to be seen as a balance of interests among all corporate stakeholders. . .
